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I n  the world of aviation an apparent contradiction exists.  
While every f l i gh t  would seem t o  harbor the possibi l i ty  of a new 
experience, it does not take long t o  find someone e l se  who can 
t e l l  a similar story. During the K i t t y  Hawk 75th anniversary 
celebration someone postulated tha t  the reason for the short 
f l i gh t  of the Wright Brothers was an encounter with unforecasted 
low level w i n d  shear. Whether true or not, the moral of tha t  
statement s t i l l  stands. Very few experiences are new. 
Historically,  p i lo t s  have recognized the value of lessons 
learned through experience and have actively sought t o  share 
the i r  experiences w i t h  others. Through formal reports, 
classroom presentation and informal conversation (otherwise 
known as hangar f lying) ,  aviators have attempted t o  share the 
benefits  of "lessons learned through experience. " Through the 
years, f l i g h t  training has been designed t o  provide for safe 
f l i g h t  by g iv ing  p i lo t s  an opportunity t o  develop necessary 
flying s k i l l s  and gain information through exposure t o  potential  
hazards. Before the existence of f l i gh t  simulators, when actual 
a i r c r a f t  flying was required, the task was somewhat d i f f i cu l t .  
Safety provisions on training f l igh ts  were mandatory. Obviously 
a check p i lo t  had t o  occupy a p i lo t  seat .  Certain maneuvers 
could not be practiced t o  a r e a l i s t i c  conclusion. Complex rea l  
world incidents could not be ent i re ly  duplicated. Verbal or 
written communication remained the only vehicle by which t o  
share experiences. 
W i t h  the advent of f l i g h t  simulators, the capabili ty t o  
r ea l i s t i ca l ly  duplicate in f l igh t  problems became possible. 
However, progress i n  t h i s  direct ion)  was slow. Maneuvers, 
originally designed t o  sa t i s fy  the safety requirements of actual 
a i r c r a f t  f l i gh t  training, were simply transferred t o  the 
simulator. I n  order t o  design significant improvements i n  
f l i g h t  crew training, regulatory change would be required. 
I n  mid-1974, the f l i gh t  training s ta f f  a t  Northwest 
Airlines began internal conversations exploring avenues of a 
possible correction for t h i s  problem. Later that  year we 
in i t ia ted  preliminary conversations w i t h  the FAA regarding 
necessary regulatory change for f l i g h t  simulator training 
programs. We were seeking approval t o  create simulator training 
programs closely related t o  the actual l ine  environment w i t h  
t o t a l  crew participation i n  real  world incident experiences. 
The FAA responded i n  a most positive fashion. O n  June 10, 1975, 
Northwest Airlines made a formal application for an exemption 
from certain regulations which stereotyped simulator f l i gh t  
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t r a i n i n g .  On February 5, 1976, we  w e r e  g r a n t e d  t h a t  exemption 
by the FAA w i t h  an  implementat ion date for the program of J u l y  
I, 1976. T h i s  a l lowed approximately f i ve  months for N o r t h w e s t  
A i r l i n e s  t o  develop  a program around the concept  o u t l i n e d  i n  the 
o r i g i n a l  r e q u e s t .  
W e  selected s i x  of o u r  m o s t  exper ienced  i n s t r u c t o r s ;  one  
Capta in  and one Second O f f i c e r  f r o m  each o f  three a i rc raf t  
types .  Taking a page f r o m  Lockheed's book, we  c r e a t e d  a n  area 
known as "the skunk works." W e  c l o i s t e r e d  the  s i x  i n s t r u c t o r s  
for a period of  three months t o  ensu re  the i r  f u l l  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
t h i s  project. Their f i rs t  d u t y  w a s  t o  r e d e f i n e  and r e f i n e  the 
program o b j e c t i v e s .  Methods and approaches w e r e  d i scussed .  One 
g u i d e l i n e  g i v e n  t o  these gent lemen w a s  t o  t h r o w  away the r u l e  
book and approach the exemption program us ing  the i r  e x t e n s i v e  
l i n e  expe r i ence  as the primary i n f l u e n c e .  As a supplement ,  
a c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by o u r  l i n e  p i l o t s  w a s  encouraged through 
both w r i t t e n  and oral  communication. 
A f t e r  i n i t i a l  s c e n a r i o s  w e r e  completed, i n s t r u c t o r  
pe r sonne l  f l ew  the s c e n a r i o s  i n  o u r  s i m u l a t o r s .  F u r t h e r  
re f inement  took  place a t  t h a t  t i m e .  Then l i n e  p i l o t  v o l u n t e e r s  
e n t e r e d  the program and f o r  the  f irst  t i m e ,  sampled the 
s c e n a r i o s .  A f t e r  f i n a l  re f inement ,  the  FAA s e n t  local  ACI's t o  
f l y  the  f i n i s h e d  products .  W e  m e t  o u r  implementat ion date of 
J u l y  1, 1976, and f r o m  t h a t  date forward, i n s t r u c t o r  and p i lo t  
feedback,  as w e l l  as comments from the FAA, gave u s  the 
i n d i c a t o r  w e  had a l l  been w a i t i n g  for-- in  f a c t  w e  d i d  have a 
m o s t  s i g n i f i c a n t  improvement t o  s i m u l a t o r  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g .  
T h e  r e g u l a t i o n  change and accompanying a d v i s o r y  c i r c u l a r  
are now h is tory .  Many a i r l i n e s  have chosen t o  develop  LOFT 
programs and have exper ienced  success .  Today, however, there i s  
n o t  t o t a l  agreement on a l l  of the p r i n c i p l e s  or the conduct  of 
LOFT. Therefore ,  the need for t h i s  conf,erence.  I would l i k e  t o  
p r e s e n t ,  i n  rather direct  f a sh ion ,  w h a t  w e  a t  N o r t h w e s t  A i r l i n e s  
F l i g h t  T r a i n i n g  r e g a r d  as  o u r  p o s i t i o n  on LOFT r e l a t i v e  t o  
c e r t a i n  p o i n t s  i n  the o u t l i n e  for t h i s  conference .  
D e f i n i t i o n  and Characteristics of LOFT 
LOFT i s  a l i n e  environment  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  program w i t h  
t o t a l  c r e w  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  real  w o r l d  i n c i d e n t  expe r i ences  w i t h  
a m a j o r  t h r u s t  toward r e s o u r c e  management. Recogni t ion and 
proper use  of a v a i l a b l e  r e sources ,  on the par t  o f  each c r e w  
m e m b e r ,  i s  a new s u b j e c t  for s i m u l a t o r  t r a i n i n g .  J u d i c i o u s  care 
is  r e q u i r e d  t o  keep  t ha t  primary goal un ta rn i shed .  
LOFT i s  n o t  fu l l -mis s ion  s i m u l a t i o n .  LOFT u t i l i z e s  f u l l -  
mi s s ion  s i m u l a t i o n  t o  create a real-world environment  b u t  f u l l  
miss ion-s imula t ion  has many u s e s  beyond o r i g i n a l  LOFT concepts .  
-
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Full-mission simulation may be used a s  a vehicle for check- 
rides, navigation training, specific emergency procedures 
training, experimental evaluations and other purposes. The 
primary t h r u s t  of LOFT i s  not specific procedure training and i s  
certainly not intended for f l i g h t  checking. A proper 
dis t inct ion between any type of full-mission simulation and LOFT 
mus t  be maintained. 
LOFT i s  learning through involvement i n  simulated real  
world incident experiences. I t  i s  i n  a sense "case book" 
education as opposed t o  "batting practice." N o  one could 
properly argue that  manual flying s k i l l s  are not important: they 
certainly are.  B u t  practically the t o t a l  t h r u s t  of past  
simulator training has been dedicated t o  precision batt ing 
practice. A proper division of t i m e  needs t o  be given both 
areas without inordinate emphasis on ei ther  one. 
I n  LOFT case-book type education, lessons are learned 
through personal involvement. The old cliche, "experience is 
the best  teacher," has def ini te ly  proven true. Comments from 
our crews indicate more has been learned and retained longer 
through LOFT involvement. 
Real-world problems m u s t  be provided. T h i s  is a basic 
departure from a i r c ra f t  systems-oriented failures.  A hardware 
fa i lure  may certainly be involved but it i s  not necessarily the 
"Star." Accident reports indicate many incidents resu l t  not 
from a single catastrophic event, b u t  rather culminate from an 
interconnected ser ies  of not so apparent elements. The 
proverbial primrose path can be created from any number of 
diverse sources. To s e t  up the problem situation, the LOFT case 
book should use reasonable real-world events t o  the extent 
possible. 
Crew interaction i s  an essential  feature of LOFT. Past 
training practices tended t o  isolate  crew members requiring them 
t o  operate as a "one man band." Contrary-wise, LOFT s t resses  the 
importance of operating the a i r c r a f t  u t i l i z i n g  the coordinated 
e f fo r t s  of a l l  crew members. Complex operational procedures 
mandate effective crew interaction. By confronting the crew 
with si tuations requiring a high degree of coordination i n  order 
t o  reach a successful conclusion, LOFT forces them t o  u t i l i z e  
interactive s k i l l s  o r  observe the consequences. A s  one of our 
p i l o t s  commented, "it is  interesting t o  see a coordinated crew 
lose i t s  coordination." A lesson was learned! 
System interaction i n  real-time is  also an integral  concept 
of LOFT. Use of to t a l  system elements requires a high degree of 
simulator sophistication and instructor expertise. The higher 
the degree of realism, consistent w i t h  cost ,  the better.  ATC, 
a i r c r a f t  sound, company radio or data l i n k ,  maintenance control, 
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f l i g h t  attendant problems, etc. ,  a l l  contribute as  elements of 
the primrose path. Placed i n  the context of real-time, the crew 
m u s t  exercise management s k i l l s  and u t i l i z e  available resources. 
These s k i l l s  cannot be effectively honed i n  a s t e r i l e  
atmosphere. 
LOFT, properly practiced, should emphasize the importance 
of posit ive f l i g h t  management. Events outside the control of 
the crew are pre-programmed i n  the LOFT scenario and w i l l  occur 
regardless of crew action. Due t o  t h i s  fact ,  inappropriate 
action or  indecision may quickly compound a s i m p l e  problem in to  
a much more serious one. O n  the other hand, properly managed, 
no compounding w i l l  resul t .  
One absolutely essential  concept for LOFT i s  protection of 
the training environment. The training environment i s  essential  
so t h a t  p i lo t s  fee l  free of checking constraints and 
stereotypes. We are human and subject t o  error .  I n  LOFT, 
mistakes w i l l  be made. According t o  D r .  Lauber, " to  some 
extent, the success and efficacy of the LOFT session depends 
upon the number of errors made; u p  t o  a point, the more the 
bet ter ."  Recognizing and observing our own errors b r i n g s  
insight in to  our own performance. To those who are hung up on 
the concept of checking and cannot be sa t i s f ied  without it, LOFT 
does have an element of checking--"self checkingl" We do learn 
from our own mistakes and "lessons learned" is  our goal. The 
response data from our exemption program graphically i l l u s t r a t e s  
that  people learn v i v i d l y  from the i r  own mistakes. The key 
question for an instructor i s  not what errors were made b u t  do 
the p i l o t s  recognize and understand why the errors were made? 
How aware are they of c r i t i c a l  events and do they have i n s i g h t  
into the i r  own performance? 
Construction and Conduct of Scenarios 
The obvious key t o  successful scenarios i s  the personnel 
assigned t o  the development project. Our approach mandates tha t  
only p i lo t s  w i t h  current l i ne  experience be involved i n  LOFT 
preparation and development. W i t h  proper guidelines and 
adequate time for preparation, our f l i g h t  instructors have 
produced outstanding resul ts .  Following are some of the 
guidelines provided our instructors : 
1. Problems m u s t  be r e a l i s t i c  or actual events. 
2. There is no requirement for any particular 
maneuver or approach; so as  t o  practice 
f l ex ib i l i t y  according t o  rea l  world parameters. 
3 .  An early problem can s e t  the stage for  a l a t e r  
major event (e.g., early engine flameout w i t h  
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restar t  c a p a b i l i t y ;  l a te r  t ha t  s a m e  engine  could  
deve lop  a f i re ) .  
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
R e m e m b e r  the real  world; f l y i n g  can be- bo r ing .  
D o  n o t  " o v e r f i l l . "  Leave t i m e  for a l u l l .  T h i s  
i s  necessa ry  b o t h  for the i l l u s i o n  of realism and 
t r a i n i n g  effect .  
A l l  s i m u l a t o r  o r  system e lements  may be 
manipulated t o  ach ieve  t h e  d e s i r e d  r e s u l t  or t o  
cover  s i m u l a t o r  d e f i c i e n c i e s  ( e .g . ,  dispatch 
release, minimum equipment l i s t ,  weather, ATC, 
c a b i n  problems, e tc . ) .  
I t  i s  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  t h a t  s c e n a r i o s  n o t  be o v e r l y  
complex. The o b j e c t i v e  i s  t o  make t h e  s c e n a r i o  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  d i f f i c u l t  so the c r e w s  w i l l  f i n d  
them c h a l l e n g i n g ,  b u t  n o t  so d i f f i c u l t  as  t o  be 
impossible. 
Provide a s t a n d a r d  i n s t r u c t o r  b r i e f i n g .  R e m e m b e r  
the b r i e f i n g  establishes a n  atmosphere and can 
mean s u c c e s s  or f a i l u r e  f o r  LOFT l e a r n i n g .  A 
good b r i e f i n g  can  se t  t h e  s t a g e  for  a s u c c e s s f u l  
d e b r i e f i n g .  
R e m e m b e r ,  t h e r e  is n o t  always a s o l u t i o n  for 
eve ry  problem. U s e  an  a c t u a l  e v e n t  or create 
rea l i s t ic  problems f o r  w h i c h  there i s  no 
procedure  or s o l u t i o n  (e.g.8 a s t u c k  l and ing  gear 
caus ing  a gear-up l and ing ;  t h i s  t y p e  of e lement  
should  n o t  be used r o u t i n e l y  i n  eve ry  s c e n a r i o ) .  
Stretch your  c r e a t i v i t y  t o  produce realism, 
Coord ina te  w i t h  s i m u l a t o r  maintenance on 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  ( e .g . ,  w e  used t h e  motion platform 
bump when i n i t i a l i z e d  t o  s i m u l a t e  push b a c k ) .  
Now th rough  programming, the s i m u l a t o r  w i l l  
produce f u l l y  s imula t ed  push back motion 
i n c l u d i n g  v i s u a l .  Such a t t e n t i o n  t o  seemingly 
s m a l l  details  w i l l  g r e a t l y  enhance the o v e r a l l  
impress ion  of r e a l i s m .  
Follow a l l  material as p r e s e n t e d  i n  Advisory 
C i r c u l a r  120-35. 
Debr i e f ing  and Assessment S tanda rds  
The d e b r i e f i n g  s e s s i o n ,  fo l lowing  a LOFT f l i g h t ,  should  be 
a c o n t i n u a t i o n  of the l e a r n i n g  expe r i ence .  W i t h  the t r a i n i n g  
atmosphere s t i l l  p rese rved ,  the d e b r i e f i n g  p r o v i d e s  each c r e w  
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member w i t h  a forum t o  verbalize the i r  self-evaluation. T h i s  
validates the depth of learning from the events j u s t  
experienced. I t  is  of paramount importance, therefore, t ha t  the 
instructor permit the participants t o  exhaust t he i r  evaluation 
before proceeding w i t h  the instructor-noted items. I n  a perfect 
si tuation, the instructor should be l e f t  w i t h  zero i t e m s  not 
already mentioned. Otherwise, the instructor should cover 
unmentioned items w i t h  t a c t  and a posit ive a t t i tude .  
During the LOFT f l igh t ,  instructors should note 
observations of the following key items for the debriefing 
session: 
1. Resource Management 
2. Crew Coordination 
3 .  Crew Management 
4. Timely Decision Making 
5. Use of Specific Procedures 
6. Problem Solving Process 
After a l l  debriefing items have been covered, the crew 
should be excused. I f  any crew members have exhibited the need 
for f u r t h e r  training, they should be called aside privately and 
the matter discussed. Perhaps t h i s  single event c a l l s  for the 
greatest  t a c t  on the par t  of the instructor.  The crew members' 
performance d i d  not consti tute a fa i lure ,  nor place the i r  job i n  
jeopardy. The " t r a in  t o  proficiency" atmosphere m u s t  be 
preserved for posit ive training t o  resul t .  
I n  October, 1976, M r .  Webster B. Todd, Jr.,  then Chairman 
of the NTSB, spoke before the Flight Safety Foundation. I n  that  
speech, M r .  Todd, speaking i n  the context of Appendix F 
CheCk/Training, stated tha t  it is: 
"A process based on checkitis--a process based almost 
on the presumption of incompetence of the p i lo t .  
Every s i x  months, e i ther  the a i r  car r ie r  inspector or  
the instructor p i l o t  t ha t  i s  checking tha t  airman is 
looking a t  h i m  from a proficiency basis . . . e he is  
to t a l ly  programmed from the time he gets i n  that  
simulator u n t i l  the time he gets out of it. He enters 
t ha t  simulator, whether he l i k e s  t o  admit it or not, 
whether the company l ikes  t o  admit it or  not, whether 
the FAA l ikes  t o  admit it or  not, he enters tha t  
simulator w i t h  a feeling i n  the back of h i s  head tha t  
somebody i s  trying t o  take h i s  ce r t i f i ca t e  away from 
him--to remove h i s  livelihood. I s u b m i t  tha t  tha t  can 
only lead t o  a basically negative training program." 
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W e  c e r t a i n l y  concur  w i t h  M r .  Todd. Regard less  of the name 
it w a s  g iven ,  past s i m u l a t o r  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g  w a s  a l m o s t  t o t a l l y  
o r i e n t e d  around a checking atmosphere. 
I n  t r u t h ,  LOFT r e p r e s e n t s  s i g n i f i c a n t  p r o g r e s s  o v e r  past  
s i m u l a t o r  f l i g h t  t r a i n i n g .  T h e  broad base of p i lo t  accep tance  
and en thus iasm is  ev idence  of p o s i t i v e  r e s u l t s .  T h e  v e r y  
founda t ion  of t h i s  program i s  ma in ta in ing  the  " t r a i n  t o  
p r o f i c i e n c y "  p o s t u r e .  I n  t h i s  framework w e  look forward t o  
f u t u r e  p r o g r e s s  and improvement. 
Discuss ion  
CAPTAIN FRINK: Tom, f irst  I want t o  e x p r e s s  on  my own j e h a l f ,  
and I a m  s u r e  on behalf o f  a l o t  of people here i n  the t r a i n i n g  
b u s i n e s s  o f  the a i r l i n e  i n d u s t r y ,  a tremendous f e e l i n g  of 
indeb tedness  t o  you and your p i o n e e r i n g  e f for t s  i n  t h i s  area and 
the wonderful  work t h a t  you have done. You have s e t  a 
tremendous example f o r  a l l  of u s #  and w e  are  going t o  do o u r  
best t o  emulate  tha t  example.  
I would l i k e  t o  ask you a couple  of q u e s t i o n s  abou t  h o w  you 
have c o m e  a long.  One of  t h e m ,  d i d  you, or do you have the same 
to t a l  amount o f  s i m u l a t o r  h o u r s  i n  t r a i n i n g  now as you had pr ior  
t o  i n s t i t u t i n g  LOFT? 
CAPTAIN NUNN: Y e s ,  Al, we do. T h i s  c a u s e s  us  a c e r t a i n  amount 
o f  concern  because LOFT is  n o t  a t o t a l  t r a i n i n g  concept .  I t  
c a n ' t  be. I t h i n k  w e  a l l u d e d  t o  the b a t t i n g  practice v e r s u s  the  
casebook t r a i n i n g  type o f  educa t ion .  W e  need a b a l a n c e  between 
the t w o ,  and w i t h  the  t i m e  w e  have now a l l o t t e d ,  i f  w e  spend the 
f u l l  f o u r  h o u r s  eve ry  y e a r  f o r  f i r s t  off icers  and f l i g h t  
engineer /second o f f i c e r s  i n  LOFT, w h e r e  are they going  t o  g e t  
the i r  b a t t i n g  p r a c t i c e ?  W e  have n o t  gone f a r  enough w i t h  LOFT 
for t h i s  t o  be a c r i t i ca l  problem, b u t  I f o r e s e e  one i n  the 
f u t u r e .  I t h i n k  w e  need t o  a d d r e s s  t ha t  a s  a v e r y  s e r i o u s  i s s u e  
here-- the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of a b a l a n c e  between t r u e  t r a i n i n g  and 
b a t t i n g  practice, b u t  w e  r e a l ' l y  have n o t  had the la t te r  either. 
I t  has been p r o f i c i e n c y  checking.  I do n o t  care whether we  ca l l  
it p r o f i c i e n c y  t r a i n i n g ,  or p r o f i c i e n c y  check, or  t r a i n i n g  i n  
l i e u  o f  a check. I t  makes no d i f f e r e n c e - - i n  r e a l i t y ,  it has 
s t i l l  been p r o f i c i e n c y  checking.  W e  need t r u e  t r a i n i n g ,  n o t  an  
appendix of maneuvers, b u t  many o f  the t h i n g s  tha t  have been 
suggested:  "the black-hole approach, the s l ippery runway 
c o n d i t i o n s  under  cross-wind, etc." W e  r e a l l y  need these i n  
t r a i n i n g .  L i k e w i s e ,  I t h i n k  we need LOFT and a b a l a n c e  between 
the t w o ,  b u t  w e  have n o t  come up w i t h  a s o l u t i o n  y e t .  
CAPTAIN FRINK: I assume tha t  a l l  of your  c r e w s ,  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  
whether t h i s  is  a shor t - range  or long-range o p e r a t i o n ,  are 
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involved  i n  LOFT. I n  other words, are you j u s t  as  apt t o  have 
your  747 c r e w s  i n  LOFT a s  your  sho r t - r ange  people? 
CAPTAIN NUNN: That w i l l  be t r u e ,  yes .  There w a s  a p e r i o d  of 
t i m e  when w e  had t o  g i v e  LOFT up because  o f  a v e r y  d rama t i c  
v e r t i c a l  movement i n  o u r  c r e w  s t r u c t u r e .  W e  had a down-turn and 
t h e n  a n  up-turn where t h e y  w e r e  go ing  through t r a n s i t i o n ,  
upgrade,  downgrade, r e q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  and so f o r t h .  That 
prec luded  the u s e  of LOFT. However, i n  a s t a t i c  s i t u a t i o n ,  t ha t  
would be our  s t a n d a r d  practice. 
CAPTAIN FRINK: How o f t e n  have you determined t ha t  a d d i t i o n a l  
t r a i n i n g  i s  necessa ry  a f t e r  one of the LOFT s e s s i o n s ?  
CAPTAIN NUNN: I d o n ' t  have the f i g u r e s ,  b u t  i t  would probably 
be less t h a n  t w o  or three p e r c e n t  of the cases. 
CAPTAIN FRINK: H a s  there been a r e a c t i o n  t o  tha t  on the pa r t  of 
your  p i lo t s?  When you g i v e  t h e m  a d d i t i o n a l  t r a i n i n g  you have 
no t ,  i n  effect ,  been g i v i n g  t h e m  " t r u e  t r a i n i n g . "  Haven ' t  you, 
i n  effect  I been checking t h e m ?  
CAPTAIN NUNN: Our p i lo t  r e a c t i o n  has been v e r y  p o s i t i v e .  T h e  
a d d i t i o n a l  t r a i n i n g  w a s  w e l c o m e d .  I t  w a s  pe rce ived  a s  b e i n g  
u s e f u l  and w a s  conducted i n  such  a way t h a t  w e  prevented  w h a t  I 
c o n s i d e r  t o  be a key i s s u e .  T h a t  i s s u e  is  the p reven t ion ,  a t  
any cost, o f  the embarrassment of a n  i n d i v i d u a l  c r e w  m e m b e r .  W e  
dare n o t  embarrass p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  and ou r  p i l o t s  and f l i g h t  
e n g i n e e r s  are p r o f e s s i o n a l s .  
CAPTAIN FRINK:  I know, t ha t  because  you b r i n g  your  c a p t a i n s  i n  
t w i c e  a y e a r  and the  f i r s t  o f f i c e r s  and e n g i n e e r s  i n  once a 
y e a r ,  you obv ious ly  cannot  g i v e  a LOFT s e s s i o n  i n  a l l  i n s t a n c e s .  
CAPTAIN NUNN: That i s  correct. 
CAPTAIN FRINK: D o  you f i n d  resentment  on the p a r t  o f  those w h o  
c o m e  i n  for  r e c u r r e n t  t r a i n i n g  and f i n d  they are n o t  g e t t i n g  
LOFT? 
CAPTAIN NUNN: Y e s .  They f e e l  as  though, i n  a sense ,  t h e y  have 
been cheated. 
CAPTAIN FRINK: Can you g i v e  u s  a n  i d e a  of w h a t  t h i s  program 
m i g h t  have cost you? D o  you have a requi rement  f o r  f u l l  c r e w ?  
I f  you have scheduled a f u l l  c r e w  and n o t  achieved  it f o r  the 
s e s s i o n ,  do you b r i n g  p i lo t s  i n  on e x t r a  t i m e ?  Have you any 
idea, or have you attempted t o  p u t  a cost f i g u r e  on LOFT? 
CAPTAIN NUNN: A l ,  i f  I answer tha t  q u e s t i o n ,  I had better n o t  
g o  h o m e .  
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CAPTAIN FRINK: Okay, I t h i n k  I w i l l  l i s t e n  for  a w h i l e ,  t hanks  
Tom. 
CAPTAIN MICHAELS: I a m  c u r i o u s  abou t  the amount o f  accep tance  
among your l i n e  c r e w s  of the LOFT program. W a s  there any 
s i g n i f i c a n t  n e g a t i v e  response?  
CAPTAIN NUNN: L e t  m e  g i v e  you a n  example of w h a t  happened a t  
the v e r y  o u t s e t .  W e  i n v i t e d  ALPA t o  come i n  and par t ic ipate  a t  
the beginning  of LOFT development.  Can I regress f o r  a minute ,  
t h e n  I w i l l  answer your  q u e s t i o n ?  
I d o  n o t  want t h i s  confe rence  t o  go  too fa r  w i t h o u t  
a d d r e s s i n g  the q u e s t i o n  of where the acronym LOFT came from. W e  
called it Coordinated C r e w  Tra in ing  ( C C T ) .  W e  had a meet ing i n  
Minneapol is  a t  N o r t h w e s t  w i t h  D r .  Lauber and s e v e r a l  i n d u s t r y  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  E a s t e r n  A i r l i n e s  had Ed Warden there, and 
there w e r e  many others i n c l u d i n g  the FAA f r o m  Washington. Dick 
C o l l i e  w a s  heading up the s e s s i o n ,  and he d i d  n o t  l i k e  CCT. 
Some o f  o u r  crews called it " C o m b a t  C r e w  Tra in ing ."  W e  w e r e  
t r y i n g  t o  develop  a n  acronym and Dick C o l l i e  said,  "You know, 
the government l i k e s  f o u r - l e t t e r  acronyms--we c a n ' t  l i v e  w i t h  a 
three-letter acronym." W e  w e r e  s c r a t c h i n g  o u r  heads, and 
everyone w a s  t r y i n g  t o  come up w i t h  something and he k e p t  
s ay ing ,  " W e l l ,  i t ' s  l i n e - o r i e n t e d ,  and i t ' s  n o t  checking,  i t ' s  
f l igh t - -by  g o l l y ,  w e ' r e  going t o  c a l l  it l i n e - o r i e n t e d  f l i g h t  
t ra ining--what  do you t h i n k ? "  I t  w a s  Dick C o l l i e  of the FAA w h o  
gave it a t i t l e .  
But, back t o  your  q u e s t i o n .  W e  i n v i t e d  ALPA t o  come i n ,  
and there w a s  a young man f r o m  the T r a i n i n g  C o m m i t t e e  i n  Seat t le  
w h o  c a m e  t o  m e  and s a i d ,  ''I want you t o  know something. I ' m  
opposed t o  th i s .  W e  had the  s a m e  t h i n g  i n  SAC ( S t r a t e g i c  A i r  
Command-USAF) . 'I H e  w a s  r e f e r r i n g  t o  SAC'S  fu l l -mis s ion  
s i m u l a t i o n .  H e  said t h a t  it c o n s i s t e d  o f  one  emergency p i l e d  on 
top of a n o t h e r  and a n o t h e r  u n t i l  the c r e w  broke,  t ha t  it w a s  
n e g a t i v e  t r a i n i n g ,  and, "We're opposed t o  it." H e  s a i d ,  " I ' m  
going t o  do eve ry th ing  I c a n  to  k i l l  it." I i n v i t e d  h i m  t o  
par t ic ipate  i n  one o f  the s c e n a r i o s .  H e  s a i d ,  "You want m e  t o  
do  t ha t ,  and g i v e  m e  ammunition?" I said,  "I want t o  g i v e  you 
a l l  t he  ammunition you need i f  i t ' s  wrong, so come on i n  and 
participate." H e  d i d .  A t  the two-hour b reak ,  he came o u t  of the 
s i m u l a t o r  m u t t e r i n g  t o  himself ,  "My gosh,  you know w h a t  I d i d ? "  
H e  w a s  shaking  h i s  head.  H e  went back i n ,  and when he came o u t  
a t  the end of the f o u r  hours ,  s w e a t  w a s  coming a l l  the  way down 
h i s  sh i r t ,  f r o m  under  h i s  armpits, and the b r o w  w a s  w e t ,  as m o s t  
people's are. H e  could  n o t  q u i t  t a l k i n g  abou t  the mis t akes  he 
had made. T h e  f i rs t  off icer  w a s  the s a m e  way .  T h a t  young man 
went away n o t  as a n  opponent  of LOFT, b u t  as a proponent .  I n  
fact ,  he a l m o s t  took on an  e v a n g e l i s t i c  zeal and say ing ,  ''1 have 
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never learned so much. I came i n  w i t h  a negative at t i tude,  and 
I went away w i t h  lessons learned." I t h i n k  tha t  i s  perhaps the 
most dramatic response tha t  we have had, b u t  it is  typical. Of 
a l l  the p i lo t s  who have gone through the program, only one or 
two have been rather lukewarm. 
CAPTAIN MICHAELS: One other question Tom. Have you had the 
program long enough for a l l  of your crews t o  have had a second 
experience w i t h  it? 
CAPTAIN NUNN: A large number, b u t  not necessarily a l l ,  and the 
response has s t i l l  been the same. 
CAPTAIN ATKATZ: Have you been able t o  document a change i n  the 
performance of crew members from one experience t o  another i n  
terms of resource management? 
CAPTAIN NUNN: I don't  know tha t  you could say tha t  we had a 
s t u d y  t ha t  documents it. How can you prove that  any training 
has prevented an incident or  an accident? I cannot say tha t  we 
have. 
CAPTAIN ATKATZ: I am not saying tha t  it prevented an incident 
or  an accident. I am saying tha t  i n  terms of t he i r  performance 
from one LOFT session t o  the next LOFT session, how d i d  they 
perform the first one as compared t o  the  second one? 
CAPTAIN NUNN: A l l  r igh t .  Again, we do not have data formally 
recorded tha t  can prove it, b u t  we have feedback from 
instructors which def ini te ly  indicates improvement i n  crew 
coordination and resource management among those who have 
undergone the i r  second or t h i r d  session--we have some who have 
gone through three LOFT sessions--rather dramatic improvement. 
CAPTAIN TRAUB: Tom, you d id  not say anything about crew 
composition w i t h  LOFT. D o  you always have a captain, f i r s t  
off icer ,  and second officer? 
CAPTAIN NUNN: Since w e  operate three-man crew airplanes, yes, 
and they are l i ne  crew members. We fee l  we cannot introduce 
instructors i n  the event someone does not show up. I f  the 
instructor knows tha t  a problem i s  corning, how can he be a 
member of a problem solving team? He knows what the problem is,  
and he knows the solution, so he is  going t o  be play acting. He 
might be a d i s t u r b i n g  element even i f  he d i d  not know what was 
coming. I t  violates the val idi ty  of the scenario, so t o  speak. 
Now i f  he is an instructor who i s  not familiar w i t h  the scenario 
and i s  qualified i n  a crew member position, I see no reason w h y  
they could not take a par t ic ipant ' s  role. 
CAPTAIN ATKATZ: D o  you f i l l  i n ,  i n  any way, i f  somebody does 
not show up i n  some situation? 
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CAPTAIN NUNN: W e  w i l l  t r y  i f  we have ti t o  go t o  crew 
es and get s one off reserve for P l a r  crew 
n. I f  w e  cann then we reve nd pendix F 
check or  training session, as  appropr 
MR. THIELKE: One question is ,  what do you the case of 
"no-shows" because of the weather, or  so g such as that?  
The second question is  tha t  you said you do not record the data 
formally. D o  you plan t o  record data regarding an individual 's  
performance from one LOFT session t o  the next? 
CAPTAIN NUNN: We do not plan t o  record it on an individual 
basis. However, we have a debriefing form for our instructors 
where we do record crew performance on specific procedures. One 
th ing  we do want t o  know--you touched on t h i s  earlier--is  where 
i s  the task loading too heavy, or w h e r e  do procedures need 
refinement? We are looking for overall  operational improvement 
u s i n g  information obtained from LOFT sessions, b u t  w i t h  regard 
t o  evaluating individual performance, we do not give grades or 
keep such information as  par t  of t he i r  record. Satisfactory 
completion i s  noted a s  par t  of the i r  record and tha t  i s  it. 
MR. THIELKE: Is tha t  a t  the end of the i r  program? 
CAPTAIN NUNN: Yes, it is .  
CAPTAIN SMITH: Have you used the LOFT approach i n  your i n i t i a l  
f i rs t  of f icer  or  captain upgrade programs, and i f  so, what has 
been the resul t  of that? 
CAPTAIN NUNN: We have not. We have used LOFT only i n  the 
context of recurrent training. We have used "capital" LOFT, as 
Walt said ea r l i e r .  We have not yet developed lower case or 
" l i t t l e "  LOFT. 
CAPTAIN KARABELLA: I have one more question concerning LOFT 
t ha t  some people have brought up previously and tha t  regards 
progress o r  gett ing ahead. I t h i n k  most everyone has a certain,  
what has been alluded t o  as, two or three percent of problem 
people, who from one six-month interval t o  the next do not 
progress. They go on. I n  what you have been doing so fa r ,  do 
you have any indication tha t  progress has been made i n  t h i s  two 
or three percent? 
CAPTAIN NUNN: Yes. We a l l  have tha t  two or three percent. 
LOFT d id  not create the problem. T h e  proficiency problem 
existed before they came into LOFT, b u t  what LOFT has done i n  
the evaluation process is  t o  give u s  a broader v i e w  of tha t  crew 
member's capabili t ies.  We have been able t o  focus and define i n  
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a much sharper fashion where h is  problem is. Maybe it was i n  
crew management, or maybe it was i n  manual flying s k i l l s .  Maybe 
he d id  not even understand command responsibil i ty or  authority, 
or  crew management. I t  has been defined by LOFT. We focused on 
it, gave h i m  additional training appropriate t o  h i s  
and they have not been repeaters. We have not had 
repeater come i n  a f t e r  he has had additional t r  
LOFT. 
MR. WARRAS: I have jus t  one comment, Tom, as  a follow-up. I n  
the early days of LOFT, I can reca l l  s i t t i n g  i n  on a period w i t h  
a captain, a 727 captain, who did not use h i s  resources 
properly. H i s  management of the crew was below average. He had 
a strong copilot  during tha t  period, and the copilot took charge 
during the whole LOFT period, and they came t o  successful 
conclusion of the operation. However, a f t e r  tha t  particular 
period, the captain remained for additional training. I 
happened t o  f l y  w i t h  h i m  i n  h i s  second LOFT period a year l a t e r ,  
and he was a completely changed individual. He was well-versed 
i n  a i r c r a f t  systems and procedures, and so on. He came back 
tha t  second period, and he real ly  knew what he was doing. He 
took charge, he took command, and he u t i l i zed  a l l  h i s  resources. 
DR. LAUBER: Thank you very much, Tom. 
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PANEL DISCUSSION OF THE FRONTIER A I R L I N E S  LOFT PROGRAM 
Capta in  R o y  W i l l i a m s  
CAPTAIN ROY WILLIAMS: I c e r t a i n l y  
has been said.  I rea l ly  do n o t  even know 
a b o u t  LOFT, b u t  we  d id  and when the Advisory C i r c u l a r  came o u t ,  
w e  went t o  N o r t h w e s t  A i r l i n e s  and rode through a f e w  of the i r  
s c e n a r i o s .  W e  adopted their  format ,  a t  least  a t  tha t  t i m e .  
W i t h  regard t o  the LOFT program i t s e l f ,  it has been v e r y  
s u c c e s s f u l .  Our b i g g e s t  problem has been  schedul ing .  W e  u s e  
LOFT i n  l i e u  of a PT ( p r o f i c i e n c y  t r a i n i n g ) ,  and w e  always 
schedu le  a l i n e  f irst  officer and a c a p t a i n ,  b u t  s o m e t i m e s ,  
g e t t i n g  those t w o  together is d i f f i c u l t .  However, i f  the 
copilot i s  i n  f o r  a PC ( p r o f i c i e n c y  check) or a PT and the 
c a p t a i n  is  scheduled for a PT, we w i l l  run  a LOFT s e s s i o n .  That 
procedure  has been approved by o u r  local FAA i n s p e c t o r .  Thus, 
there is  the poss ib i l i t y ,  a l though  it has n o t  happened so far ,  
t h a t  a f i r s t  o f f i c e r  could  go t w o  or three years and never  have 
a PC, i n  theory, and would never  be examined on the r e q u i r e d  
Appendix F maneuvers. 
Another  problem i s  convinc ing  o u r  c r e w s  t ha t  the  program is  
in t ended  for t r a i n i n g  and n o t  checking purposes .  Our local FAA 
s a y s ,  "Oh,  no, no: i t ' s  a check-ride as far  as w e  are 
concerned."  W e  have been arguing  the  p o i n t  back and forth. 
However, a t  any t i m e ,  i f  you b r i n g  a c r e w  i n ,  t e l l  t h e m  tha t  
LOFT i s  f o r  t r a i n i n g  purposes  o n l y ,  and t h e n  la ter  inform t h e m  
t ha t  t h e i r  performance has been u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ;  you have thrown 
the e n t i r e  program o u t  the window. I n  a s m a l l  a i r l i n e  l i k e  
F r o n t i e r ,  a l l  they have  t o  do i s  go  back t o  the c r e w  room and 
t h i r t y  minutes  la ter  no one i s  going t o  accept the program. 
W e  t h i n k  LOFT i s  good, and u s e  the program q u i t e  a b i t .  W e  
f e e l  ou r  s y s t e m  i s  unique i n  t h a t  w e  w r i t e  30 or 40 minute  l e g s  
i n t o  o u r  s c e n a r i o s ,  and t h a t  works o u t  b e a u t i f u l l y .  W e  can  pick 
any t r i p  w e  want and d e s i g n  the s c e n a r i o  for three hour s  and 
twenty minutes  which l e a v e s  u s  f o r t y  minutes  left-- something we  
feel  i s  impor tan t .  I n  t ha t  period, w e  can  cover  any th ing  t h a t  
an  i n s t r u c t o r  f e e l s  may be a problem. T h i s  system creates no 
embarrassment,  and w e  can  r e t u r n  h i m  t o  the l i n e .  W e  f e e l  t ha t  
i s  v e r y  impor t an t ,  A t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  I w i l l  answer any specific 
q u e s t i o n s .  
CAPTAIN HARDY: I f  you detect a d e f i c i e n c y  i n  one p a r t i c u l a r  
c r e w  m e m b e r ,  would you t r a i n  h i m  t o  p r o f i c i e n c y  i n  t h a t  40 
minute  period or would you b r i n g  h i m  back la ter?  
CAPTAIN WILLIAMS: W e  would t r y  t o  t r a i n  h i m  i n  t h a t  40 minutes .  
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CAPTAIN HARDY: You would not b r ing  h i m  back la te r?  
CAPTAIN WILLIAMS: Well, it depends on what the problem is. 
Last week we had one LOFT session where the f i r s t  off icer  was 
unsatisfactory i n  terms of the conduct of the checklist and 
other procedural th ings .  I n  tha t  case, we brought h i m  back into 
another LOFT session the following day a f t e r  te l l ing  h i m  what 
h i s  particular problem was. A l l  he had t o  do was go home, s t u d y  
it a while, and he was fine. 
We have found LOFT t o  be very effective.  We use problems 
that  have been identified i n  l ine  operations, both mechanical 
types of things as well a s  decision-making problems. 
CAPTAIN TRAUB: Earlier you said the scenarios were 30 or 40 
minu tes  i n  length. Do you put several of these together? 
CAPTAIN WILLIAMS: Oh ,  I meant the stage length. 
CAPTAIN TRAUB: O h ,  I see, and you p u t  that  whole program 
together? 
CAPTAIN WILLIAMS: Well, we take an actual t r i p :  Denver t o  
Great Falls,  through Casper, and on t o  B i l l i n g s  i s  a good 
example. We use the exact t r i p ,  the exact times, turnaround 
times--everything is  identical  t o  the actual t r i p .  When the 
crew arrives,  they receive a f l i gh t  release, a computerized 
f l i gh t  plan, and we p r i n t  weather information for the scenario. 
I t  i s  no different  than i f  he went t o  the crew room, got h i s  
papers, and took the t r i p .  They are exact t r i p s .  That i s  one 
thing about being a small airline--we cannot really write a 
scenario tha t  most p i lo t s  have not actually flown on the line. 
That helps a l o t .  
CAPTAIN STEGER: D i d  you say your FAA considers LOFT a check 
ride? 
CAPTAIN WILLIAMS: Yes, it is  a check, b u t  our FAA considers any 
time a p i l o t  goes into the simulator w i t h  a check airman t o  be a 
checking environment, even i f  it i s  a practice session. 
CAPTAIN STEGER: How do you resolve that? How do you get  the 
p i l o t s  t o  accept, t o  have the proper a t t i tude  toward LOFT w i t h  
tha t  a t t i tude  from the FAA? 
CAPTAIN WILLIAMS: Well, we b a t t l e  a lot-- (laughter) we do not 
actually t e l l  our p i lo t s  tha t  they a re  being checked. We t e l l  
them tha t  LOFT i s  LOFT, and tha t  there real ly  i s  no fai lure ,  
provided they do not completely f a l l  out of t he i r  tree--you 
know, f l y  the t r i p  upside down or something. Fortunately, the 
FAA has stayed away from us, for some reason, on LOFT. They do 
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emphasize the fac t  that  they want people grounded, m o r e  or less, 
j u s t  as i f  t h e y  fa i led a PC or a PT. 
M F t .  HUETTNER: I ' m  n o t  going t o  touch  any of that ,  b u t  I do have 
one q u e s t i o n .  You mentioned that  you w e r e  s m a l l  and t ha t  w o r d  
g e t s  around qu ick ly .  How do keep the c r e w s  t ha t  have been 
through the  s c e n a r i o s  f r o m  informing those tha t  have n o t ,  so 
t h a t  it c a n  t r u l y  be a LOFT-type t r a i n i n g  program? 
CAPTAIN WILLIAMS: W e l l ,  a t  the moment w e  have s i x  s c e n a r i o s .  
W e  have o n l y  600 p i lo t s  and o n l y  a b o u t  400 of those are jet- 
p i lo t s .  W e  do n o t  u s e  the LOFT program for the Convair  580--we 
do n o t  have a s i m u l a t o r  w i t h  a v i s u a l  system for t ha t  a i r p l a n e .  
Another aspect i s  schedul ing .  W e  have been us ing  LOFT 
s i n c e  ear ly  1979. W i t h  c a p t a i n s  and f irst  off icers  scheduled 
t o g e t h e r  and the c a p t a i n  be ing  on a PT and n o t  a PC, w e  s t i l l  
have n o t  g o t t e n  through the e n t i r e  p i l o t  list. To m y  knowledge, 
no one has e v e r  repeated the same LOFT s c e n a r i o .  I f  t h e y  d i s c u s s  
s c e n a r i o s ,  the chances are that  t h e y  w i l l  n o t  g e t  the same 
s c e n a r i o  even i f  t h e y  j u s t  went t o  c r e w  r o o m  and informed about  
the w h o l e  t h ing .  T h e  odds of ano the r  c r e w  doing the s a m e  t h i n g  
are v e r y  s m a l l  w i t h i n  a short t i m e  frame. 
CAPTAIN ATKATZ: I want t o  ask Tom a q u e s t i o n  i n  r e f e r e n c e  t o  
h i s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i t h  the FAA. Have you had any and i f  so, h o w  
have you r e s o l v e d  t h e m ?  
CAPTAIN NUNN: W e  have o n l y  had d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i t h  one or t w o  
p a r t i c u l a r  A C I ' s  ( A i r  Carrier I n s p e c t o r s )  w h o  s a t  i n  on a LOFT 
s e s s i o n  and sa id ,  " T h a t  man fa i led."  I take the A C I  t o  the back 
room and t a l k  t o  h i m  i n  a ve ry  direct  f a sh ion .  W e  p u l l  material 
o u t  f r o m  the approved t r a i n i n g  program, and w e  d i s c u s s  it. H e  
concurs  tha t  the man w i l l  con t inue  t r a i n i n g  or tha t  he 
misunderstood the program, and w e  have r e so lved  the problem 
there wi thou t  it g e t t i n g  t o  the p i l o t .  I t  has never  affected a 
p i l o t ,  so w e  have had no problem, r e a l l y .  
CAPTAIN ATKATZ: W e l l ,  w h a t  i s  the a t t i t u d e  o f  the i n d i v i d u a l ?  
CAPTAIN NUNN: A s  far as o u r  p r i n c i p a l  i s  concerned,  there is  a 
depth of unders tanding  of LOFT. W e  r e c e i v e  e x c e l l e n t  s u p p o r t  i n  
t h a t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  f r o m  the FAA. 
CAPTAIN WILLIAMS: I would l i k e  t o  make a p o i n t  i n  regard t o  the 
i s s u e  of the s c e n a r i o  c o n t e n t s  becoming well-known. A s  I said, 
we  have s i x  s c e n a r i o s ,  and t ha t  i s  a l o t  of material. W e  t r y  t o  
keep t h e m  c o n f i d e n t i a l ,  b u t  even i f  the c o n t e n t  g o t  o u t ,  no one 
c a n  p o s s i b l y  know when the f a u l t s  o r  systems problems w i l l  be 
in t roduced .  But, i f  they want t o  go o u t  and share t h e m ,  f i n e .  
I n  one s e n s e ,  that  is o u r  goal. When w e  c a n  g e t  c r e w s  t a l k i n g  
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about what they d id  i n  training, t h a t ' s  jus t  absolutely super, 
b u t  they a re  s t i l l  going t o  have t o  solve the problem when they 
get into the simulator, even i f  they know what i s  coming. 
W e  had a guy sneak out a copy of a scenario, and he studied 
it the night before. He s t i l l  came out sweating the 
armpits, He s t i l l  made mistakes, some rather dramatic mistakes, 
and he s t i l l  learned from the experience. We have found tha t  t o  
be absolutely no problem, 
DR. LAUBER: Any more questions for Roy? 
UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Again, t o  respond t o  Charlie (Huettner), maybe 
for  smaller a i r l i nes  and possibly s a change i n  the Advisory 
Circular; we could s t a r t  with three s enarios and add one each 
year. That would allow on-going change i n  the program. A t  
l e a s t  it i s  something for the discussion groups t o  consider. 
DR. LAUBER: You w i l l  indeed have that  opportunity when we give 
the working groups the i r  instructions l a t e r  t h i s  afternoon. 
CAPTAIN WILLIAMS: John, I would l i k e  t o  say tha t  we change our 
scenarios every year. 
UKNOWN SPEAKER: A l l  five of them? 
CAPTAIN WILLIAMS: A l l  s i x  of them, right.  We pick different  
routes--we may use some of the problems again, b u t  we do change 
the scenarios, and our approval i s  based upon that .  That is  
another reason tha t  why the p i lo t s  do not get  too familiar w i t h  
them. 
CAPTAIN WINTENBURG: I would just  l ike t o  know, what was your 
cost factor--not i n  actual dollars,  b u t  compared t o  what we 
heard about Northwest's experience? 
CAPTAIN WILLIAMS: I n  developing the LOFT program i t s e l f ?  Well, 
actually it was d i r t  cheap because we went t o  Northwest and s o r t  
of copied the i r  program-- (laughter)--right down t o  the way we 
wrote our scenarios. I n  fact ,  the one they are miss ing ,  I have. 
(laughter) 
MR. HUETTNER: I j u s t  want t o  say tha t  a s  fa r  as the FAA and 
monitoring of programs are concerned, we look a t  t h i s  as  an 
ent i re ly  new program, and we are going t o  to ta l ly  rethink the 
process of recurrent training--something I tr ied t o  say a t  the 
beginning. A s  w e  go through the regulatory e f for t ,  there w i l l  
be a whole new set  of guidelines and instructions t o  our f ie ld  
people i n  order t o  help standardize the i r  approach t o  the 
monitoring of programs i n  the f ie ld .  We expect something 
similar t o  the misunderstanding which occurred w i t h  the advanced 
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s imu 1 a to r r e g u l a t i o n  W e  w i l l  b r i n g  a l l  the p r i n c i p a l  
i n s p e c t o r s  t o g e t h e r  t o  d i s c u s s  these t s of t h i n g s  once  w e  
have decided h o w  it is  going  t o  be. o u l d  l i ke  everyone here 
t o  a t  least  feel unshackled w i t h  respe velopment o f  
t h i s  program. W e  w i l l  do o u r  utmost  o u r  people 
i n  the years a 
CAPTAIN WILLIAMS: L e t  m e  s ay  one t h i n g .  I n o t  want  it t o  
ge t  back t o  o u r  POI ( P r i n c i p a l  Opera t ing  I n s p e c t o r )  t ha t  I w a s  
running h i m  down. T h e  FAA has never  sa t  i n  on a LOFT program 
and caused one of o u r  p i l o t s  t o  be grounded. T h e  o n l y  t h i n g  I 
w a s  r e f e r r i n g  t o  w a s  t ha t  it would be n i c e  t o  be able t o  t e l l  
ou r  p i l o t s  tha t  th i s  i s  n o t  a check environment .  T h i s  i s  
s t r i c t l y  t r a i n i n g ,  and w e  are n o t  go ing  t o  f a i l  you, so t o  
speak. What the FAA is r e a l l y  concerned about--and you c a n ' t  
r ea l ly  b l a m e  them--is p r o f i c i e n c y ,  b u t  w e  have a moral 
o b l i g a t i o n .  T h i s  program i s  no d i f f e r e n t  t h a n  a l ine-check  i n  a 
real a i r p l a n e .  I f  I g i v e  a l ine-check and a p i l o t  i s  obv ious ly  
n o t  do ing  h i s  job, I a m  going t o  remove h i m  from the t r i p .  That 
i s  w h a t  t h e y  are concerned w i t h  (so are w e ) .  But, it c e r t a i n l y  
helps i f  you can  t e l l  your  p i l o t s  when they come i n  for a LOFT 
t ha t  you are n o t  going t o  f a i l  them--that i t ' s  n o t  going t o  be a 
black mark on  their  record. W e  have t o  be c a r e f u l ,  FAA wants  
o u r  a s s u r a n c e  tha t  w e  are n o t  going t o  l e t  a n  u n q u a l i f i e d  man 
f l y  the  l i n e .  That i s  a l l  I w a s  t r y i n g  t o  say .  
CAPTAIN F R I N K :  W e  are going t o  cover  th i s  w h o l e  area, the 
semant ics  of e v a l u a t i o n ,  checking v e r s u s  t r a i n i n g ,  and so forth: 
i n  ou r  working group. W e  are v e r y  anx ious  t o  g e t  a l l  of t h i s  
cleared up, so w e  w i l l  be coping w i t h  the semant ics  of t h i s .  
DR. LAUBER: Good. Roy, thank  you ve ry  much. 
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